In response to the Huffington Post blog referenced here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anna-leahy
What made the Shuttle (and the entire STS program) "the most complicated machine ever built by humankind" was the *imposed* need for Small Business Administration fulfillment. A very large percent of each spacecraft had to be built by both small and economically restricted businesses. Over 2.4 million components (most) produced by separate businesses on paper diagrams before the internet even existed. I have seen portions of those documents at (retired) Rockwell facilities. 10's of thousands of pages.
This was typical of the entire government contracting system of the 70's and 80's and not the fault of NASA. Essentially *any* aerospace company worked under the same rules. Inherent in this process is also a "freeze" of technology at the same time. Computers with the power of an Apple IIe were the initial processors used on board. Due to the cost and complexity of "redesign" this remained the case far longer than similar computers were used anywhere else.
What that procurement legacy gave us was a spacecraft system that was built by 10's of thousands of people who were both "the lowest bidder" as well as often a "mom and pop" shop.
Although they worked to exacting tolerances the lifetime of the STS program was spread over 40 years. Many of those shops simply closed/retired/went out of business over the decades. Although major components could be recreated (if necessary), the cost of long term procurement continued to spiral.
I agree with Senator John Glenn's public statement(s) and feel that the shuttle program was cancelled (by the George W. Bush administration) woefully early. However the complexity of the system and the design requirements resulted in a "cost per pound" for cargo which was painfully high.
However, there was (and is!!!) no other system that could have matched the Shuttles ability to move very large and very specific payloads into orbit. A "Cost-per-pound" on a payload of 40,000 lbs can not rationally be compared to a cost per lb of 2,600 lbs of payload per flight.
Also the STS (Shuttle) program was hammered by cost cuts that followed the initial announcement of the program even during the Nixon Administration. Even *that* far back, there were fundamental design changes (SRB's [solid rocket boosters] & external fuel tank verses a 100% reusable launch assist vehicle) that *haunted* the program through its history.
What Spacex (and others) gives us is indeed the efficiency of "one roof/one builder" design and operation.
This was simply not possible during the shuttle era... the ability for one technician (who has worked the production line) to assist in diagnosing a problem (under a vertical rocket on a launch pad) is an amazing gift that anyone in the Mercury/Gemini/Apollo/Shuttle program would have begged for.
The ability to self test and analyze (250 times a second) an engine in the 1/2 second before "launch release" is beyond the capabilities of technology 20 years ago, much less 40.
However, this is not a fault of NASA, or Congress, or any outside agency, but *all* of them. The conflict between "long lead" purchases and designs that take decades (or longer) and a national ethos that requires quarterly budgets and stockholder (or political) mandates is the fundamental conflict of our nation.
How do we possibly compete in this arena? In all honesty... poorly.
How do we respond when one political administration requires a program with its own "vision" and the next administration is forced to respond and redirect under those provisions? The fact that a mandate for the Orion (MPCV) was made by an administration and *zero* funding was provided for it to take place is often lost on folks. This is not a failure of NASA but of our political system as a whole.
*Any* public agency (or publicly traded company) is in that same position. Could any American company that reports to an outside board of directors build something with a 10 or 20 year timeline?
Could they do it with safety as a paramount concern?
Could they execute each and every operation with exacting tolerance? With the exception of current aircraft producers, I think that the answer would be "no". Could they do it efficiently with maximum cost savings? "Heck no". Under military procurement requirements? "(deleted) NO"
Add in the fact that *each* representative (Congress/Contracts administrator/
The fact that *any* spacecraft is successfully flown under those restrictions is a testament to both the people of NASA and their ability to work with painfully complex and restrictive situations.
The spacecraft flown by NASA JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena) are a prime example of taking the incredibly complex process and bringing it "in house". Keeping as much of the process under "one roof" as possible is proof that the process *can* work. JPL's history of unmanned space exploration is unmatched on the planet. (I have met a few of their folks too).
Every single time I have encountered a NASA (or Ex-NASA) employee (hundreds at this point), I have been amazed "beyond words" at their dedication to their craft, their intelligence and their "passion" for what they do. This spans the entire line from press interactions with their senior management to trainers for the STS program and the folks that run their social media system (#nasasocial). These are amazing people... without exception.
My biggest concern about the end of the shuttle era is not the shuttle itself. It is dispersion of the "brain trust" of brilliant engineers and technicians that flew her from the Space Coast and Houston. As these folks (a few I have met) scatter to the 4 winds, a irreplaceable *American* resource was lost. The *people* of NASA are what kept spacecraft in the air. Now the people of Spacex (and the other COTS providers) are tasked with the same thing. There are obviously significant differences between NASA and its COTS providers. The "how" things are done by NASA spaceflight has been a learning process as complex as the shuttle design itself.
However the COTS providers do things *differently*. They are largely privately operated and have an ability to function in near autonomy. This gives them both a political advantage as well as technological advantage. The integration of the COTS providers into the NASA system will be complex at times but if they are anything like the few I have met so far they are likely to be successful at their endeavors.
There have been lessons hard learned by NASA. Everything I have seen so far leads me to believe that these lessons will not have to be "relearned" by Spacex and the other COTS providers.
However both the number of (former) NASA employees (including astronauts) that populate the COTS providers (see the "scattering of the brain trust" above) will likely eliminate that learning curve. Even more inherent is the fact that the independent (COTS) launch providers have near autonomy to "make sure things are safe at all costs." (During early shuttle launches political pressure was exerted from outside the agency on many different levels... sometimes affecting safety.)
As Spacex continues to test fly their vehicles (remember, these are *test flights!*) more and more of each launch vehicle will be available for re-use, reducing costs and turnaround time even further. The goal of a 100% reusable spacecraft is not just "within reach" but being designed and built by them right now.
Spacex and the COTS program are not a sign of NASA's demise but a giant billboard advertising their combined success.
The ability to flow NASA developed technology "to the general public" is often the most forgotten part of their original mandate.
If there has been one failure by NASA it has been their failure to publicize the fact that "this technology was originally designed by/under a NASA contract."
Imagine blue NASA "meatball" stickers on car components, dishwashers, solar heaters... your life would be more blue and red than an American Flag is now.
The fact that this sticker is not on your cellphone, on your car, on pacemakers & ventilators, on big rig trucks, aircraft wings, commercial flight software and literally millions of other devices that affect our lives everyday is often lost on most Americans, to the detriment of NASA funding.
